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The Supreme Court shows a growing determination in its antitrust
decisions to convert laws designed to promote competition into laws
which regulate or hamper the competitive process.' Succeeding inter-
pretations of the Clayton2 and Robinson-Patman 3 Acts-and, by in-
fectious contamination, the Sherman Act 4-demonstrate an increasingly
apparent disregard for the central purpose of antitrust, the promotion
of consumer welfare through the promotion of a competitive market
process. Now, in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,5 the Supreme
Court has used section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act0 to strike
directly at price competition itself.
For more than 30 years there has been, except to a small but increas-
ing number of skeptics, an ambiguity whether the Robinson-Patman
Act is a law in favor of or opposed to competition. The statute, al-
though phrased in terms of a "lessening of competition" or "tendency
toward monopoly," also includes, and in the alternative, a more am-
biguous clause: "or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination . . . ."7 All of these phrases, but especially the last, have
been interpreted to protect competitors at the expense of the com-
petitive process.
Such restrictive interpretations have eliminated in some measure
the ambiguity of the Robinson-Patman Act, although the clarity pro-
duced is scarcely a happy one. But the residue of confusion which
remains continues to trouble practitioners, commentators and lower
courts, if not the present majorities of the Federal Trade Commission
and the Supreme Court. Does, or should, the first clause of section 2(a),
which refers to anticompetitive effect in general-language which the
t Professor of Law and Economics, Yale University. A.B. Washington University,
M.A. Yale University.
1. See generally Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, FoRTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138,
expanded and revised in 65 CoLUm. L. Rxv. 363 (1965).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1964).
3. Id. §§ 13, 13a-b, 21a.
4. Id. §§ 1-7.
5. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964).
7. Id.
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Robinson-Patman Act shares with sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act"
-complement or conflict with the language referring to the more
specific competition "with any person"?
The Supreme Court decision in Utah Pie resolves the competitor-
competition dilemma, and with a vengeance, against competition. The
case arose from a claim for treble damages by the Utah Pie Company
against three respondents-the Pet Milk Company, the Carnation Milk
Company and the Continental Baking Company-which had allegedly
injured the plaintiff's competitive position by selling frozen fruit pies
at discriminatory prices in the Salt Lake City market, thereby violating
section 2(a). The facts showed that the Utah Pie Company, a local
baker, entered the frozen-pie business in late 1957 and built a new
plant in 1958. The Salt Lake City frozen-pie market was a rapidly
expanding one, growing from about 57,000 dozen pies in 1958 to al-
most 267,000 dozen pies in 1961. Before the entry of Utah Pie, it was
served principally by branches of national food companies with plants
outside Utah. The Utah Pie Company, with local production ad-
vantages, adopted an aggressive market campaign based on low prices.
During its first full year of business, 1958, Utah Pie was thereby able
to garner two-thirds of the frozen fruit pie market in Salt Lake City.
The three respondents, faced with new and vigorous price competition,
chose not to watch idly while their customers were being lost. Instead
they sought to retain or expand their sales by lowering their prices in
Utah. As a consequence, although Utah Pie's sales and profits continued
to expand, its share of the market dropped from 66.5 per cent in 1958
to 34.3 per cent in 1959, then rose to 45.5 and 45.3 per cent in 1960
and 1961. (See chart 1.)
The response by Pet, Carnation and Consolidated to the price reduc-
tions by Utah Pie on occasion made their prices in Salt Lake City
lower than in other markets. And at times, depending upon relative
price conditions in the various markets, higher prices prevailed near
the respondents' bakeries than in the more distant Utah market. Al-
though the jury rejected the allegation of a conspiracy, it found that
the respondents had individually violated section 2(a) by this "area
price discrimination."
The court of appeals overturned the verdict.9 In its view the central
issue was whether the evidence against the allegedly price-discriminat-
ing competitors was sufficient to support a finding of probable injury
8. Id. §§ 14, 18.
9. Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1965).
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to competition. The court held that there was not such evidence of an
adverse effect on competition.
The Supreme Court in reversing spoke of this "single issue" to
which the court of appeals addressed itself and then went on to decide
that the lower court's finding of no probable adverse effect on compe-
tition was overcome by the decline in the share of the market held by
the plaintiff, Utah Pie. Thus, an adverse effect on a competitor, even
on one in a quasi-monopoly position, whose sales and profits continue
to expand, and whose only injury is the loss of market dominance as
a result of price competition which he himself engenders, is enough
for the Supreme Court.
But that is not all. The Court found evidence that the Robinson-
Patman Act was violated in the working of the competitive process
itself, since the price level in Utah was eroded as a result 1 -- and eroded
to the benefit of consumers without evidence that either the purpose or
the effect of the competition was to further an eventual monopoly.
Mr. Justice White, as clearly and unambiguously as anyone could,
used the very evidence of competition which convinced the court of
appeals that no violation existed to decide that there was an antitrust
violation. The core of the Supreme Court holding is contained in the
following sentences of the opinion:
The major competitive weapon in the Utah market was price.
The location of petitioner's plant gave it natural advantages in the
Salt Lake City marketing area and it entered the market at a
price below the then going prices for the respondents' compar-
able pies. For most of the period involved here [1958-1961] its
prices were the lowest in the Salt Lake City market. It was,
however, challenged by each of the respondents at one time or
another and for varying periods. There was ample evidence to
show that each of the respondents contributed to what proved
to be a deteriorating price structure over the period covered by
this suit, and each of the respondents in the course of the ongoing
price competition sold frozen pies in the Salt Lake market at
10. Respondents had relied upon Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir.
1961), and Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964), in arguing in support of the
opinion of Judge Phillips in the court of appeals, namely, that "no primary line injury
to competition was found." 386 U.S. at 703 n.15. Mr. Justice White finds these cas
"readily distinguishable" because in these cases, unlike Utah Pie, "there was no general
decline in the price structure attributable to defendant's price discrimination ...." Id.
at 704 n.15. Instead, White ites with approval an FTC decision in Maryland Baking Co.,
52 F.T.C. 1679 (1956), aj'd, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957), which held that creating competi-
tion in an almost completely monopolized local market could not nullify a finding of price
discrimination.
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prices lower than it sold pies of like grade and quality in other
markets considerably closer to their plants.11
The case involved injury to "competition" in the sellers' market.
The court of appeals, as Mr. Justice White acknowledged, had "placed
heavy emphasis on the fact that Utah Pie constantly increased its sales
volume and continued to make a profit."' 2 But White views the Robin-
son-Patman Act as more concerned with "ground rules of the game"'u
than with probable competitive effects. He finds no need for a showing
that discriminatory prices for pies of like grade and quality "con-
sistently undercut"1 4 other competitors. Nor is there a need for a
showing of "blatant [or non-blatant] predatory price discriminations
employed with the hope of immediate [or eventual] destruction of a
particular competitor."' 5 The court of appeals found no evidence of
predatory intent. Mr. Justice White said there was "some" but did not
specify the evidence, nor relate it to either the elimination of competi-
tion or even its possible effect on the Utah Pie Company. He ack-
nowledged, "It might be argued that the respondents' conduct
displayed only fierce competitive instincts."'" But, implicitly acknowl-
edging the flimsiness of the intent evidence, he then said that not only
does "actual intent to injure" call for exclusion from this "competitive"
category, but so also "when viewed in the context of the Robinson-
Patman Act, do persistent sales below cost and radical price cuts them-
selves discriminatory."'7 Thus, with no evidence of any effect except
an increase in competition, and with no showing of intent or of
persistent sales below cost, non-uniform price cuts alone must create
the violation. What there is about nonuniform price cuts that is more
injurious to competition-or for that matter even to competitors--
than across-the-board price cuts the opinion never explains.
Neither does it establish any rational guidelines for acceptable com-
petitive behavior. The White opinion, by so belaboring the fact that
the respondents occasionally sold their pies in Salt Lake City more
cheaply than in markets closer to their manufacturing plants, seems to
insist upon a rigid standard of uniform delivered prices. But the same
11. 386 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 702.
13. Id.
14. Id. The record shows that only occasionally were respondents' prices lower than
in markets nearer their California plants. See charts 2 & 3, pp. 80.81 infra, for lowest
prices by months.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 702 n.14.
17. Id.
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logic might suggest that transportation costs must be fully reflected in
higher prices in markets farther from the factory-i.e., that uniform
mill net pricing should be the test.
The decision itself has not, of course, eliminated the technically
available defense of proving a good faith "meeting" (as opposed to
"beating") of a competitor's price. But now price-matching of the sort
that cartels promote is encouraged if not all but compelled by the
Robinson-Patman Act without diminishing at all the risks of a charge
of price collusion under the Sherman Act; the dilemma may be par-
ticularly acute where the competing sellers in a market are few, as in
Utah Pie.'8
Neither does this decision provide any predictable "cost justifica-
tion" escape for competitors caught in the Act's net. Private-label sales
were made by respondent Pet Milk Company and by petitioner Utah
Pie Company to Safeway Stores at prices below those of equivalent
frozen pies sold to others under regular brands. Utah Pie also sold
even larger quantities of private-label pies (Frost 'N' Flame) at special
prices to another account in 1960 and 1961.10 In its sale to Safeway, Pet
Milk made a contract in accordance with Safeway's established practice
of requiring its suppliers to cost-justify their sales. The Supreme Court
indicated little sympathy for anything but detailed and complete cost
justification. Pet admitted that its cost justification figures were drawn
from past performances. "[E]ven crediting the data accompanying the
1960 contract regarding cost differences," wrote Mr. Justice White,
"Pet's additional evidence would bring under the justification um-
brella only 1959 sales. Thus, at the least, the jury was free to consider
the 1960 Safeway sales as inadequately cost justified. These sales ac-
counted for 12.3 per cent of the entire Salt Lake City market in that
year." 2° The next sentence of the opinion then restresses the dominant
theme of the whole case: "In the context of this case, the sales to Safe-
way are particularly relevant since there was evidence that private-
label sales influenced the general market, in this case depressing overall
market prices."'- Perhaps the Pet Milk Company was not as meticulous
as it should have been in detailing a cost defense since the absence of
competitive injury to Utah Pie seemed so apparent. In any event, the
18. Chart 1, p. 72 supra, which was compiled from the court of appeals opinion,
indicates that in the Utah market four firms sold over 90 per cent of the frozen pies
in 1961. The petitioner, Utah Pie Co., sold 45.3 per cent, and the three respondents, Pet
lilk, Carnation, and Continental Baking, sold respectively 29.4, 8.8 and 8.3 per cent.
19. See chart 1, p. 72 supra.
20. 386 U.S. at 695 n.10.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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Utah Pie decision provides no clarification of the cost justification de-
fense. Confusion still reigns. As Professor Adelman has stressed, "[T]he
lengthy and confusing rigmarole prescribed by Robinson-Patman has
nothing to do with costs as they exist in the real world and influence
business conduct. '22 The operative costs as far as producers are con-
cerned, under competition or under monopoly, are the incremental
costs of making particular sales. And these costs, properly conceived,
are opportunity costs-that is, the income foregone from the next best
alternative use of the resources committed to the enterprise to produce
the goods in question. Under this analysis, historical costs in the con-
ventional sense have no rational relevancy to pricing policy. In the
Utah Pie case the respondents incurred transportation costs on Utah
sales. The magnitude of the cost advantage this afforded Utah Pie as
a local producer is not revealed. But Pet, Carnation and Consolidated
did lower prices in Utah rather than withdraw from the market. In
economic terms this simply demonstrates that the companies decided
their returns in Salt Lake City after this pricing action would still be
higher than the alternative of not selling in Utah or selling more else-
where. Since the Robinson-Patman Act ignores this economic reality,
it should not be surprising that the "cost justification" defense turns
out to be a mirage.
"In no field of the law is the danger of petrified opinion and casuistic
reasoning greater than in antitrust."' And nowhere, it might be added,
has this danger been substantiated more clearly than by the havoc
wrought on the competitive process in Robinson-Patman cases. Regard-
less of the motives or intentions of the framers of the Act to make life
more secure for independent business units competing with the chains,
the Act itself has as its stated aim the preservation of competition and
the prevention of monopoly. Whether or not it was seriously urged in
the legislature that the Act should have as its ultimate purpose the pro-
tection of particular competitors at the expense of competition, the
legislature found it expedient to phrase the statute in terms of compe-
tition.
This is not to say that this Act, or indeed the Clayton Act which it
was designed to shore up, was not concerned with the fate of competi-
tors, the elimination of whom would create a market structure inimical
to a competitive system. But in measuring the concern of the Robinson-
22. Adelman, Book Review, go U. Cim. L. REv. 791, 792 (1963).
23. Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Corpetitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. 'REV. 625(1966).
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Patman Act for competitors, the Act should be read as a statutory
embodiment of an economic hypothesis about the means by which
competition might be restricted or monopoly created through acts of
aggression against particular competitors to drive them out or keep
them out of markets-markets which, it must be emphasized, could be
expected in the absence of such long-run effects to provide consumers
more of what they wanted at lower costs.
The Robinson-Patman Act rests upon a presumption that price
discrimination can or might be used as a monopolizing technique.
This, as more recent economic literature confirms, is at best a highly
dubious presumption. But even if it were not, the fact that price dis-
crimination may tend toward monopoly scarcely deserves ballooning
into the proposition that, absent positive evidence to the contrary, it
can be expected to have the result of eliminating competition by
killing off or disciplining rivals.
A "kill-the-rival" theory of price discrimination is only one of three
competing theories of why price discrimination might be practiced.24
The other two, unlike the first, are theoretically plausible and have
empirical support. In addition to (1) the incipient monopoly achieved
by killing rivals (or barring them from the market) are (2) price dis-
crimination for the purpose of maximizing revenue from a monopoly
position already held,25 and (3) price discrimination practiced for the
purpose and with the effect of creating rather than eliminating compe-
tition, either defensively to protect or build market acceptance, or
offensively as a means of eroding an existing monopoly, quasi-mon-
opoly or cartel.26
The second of the three price-discrimination theories-maximizing
the revenue from a monopoly position by segregating noncompeting
customers and charging them different prices related to their differing
elasticities of demand-was not at issue in the Utah Pie case. Large
buyers, particularly Safeway and Associated Grocers, did receive lower
prices for their private-brand pies, the former from Pet, the latter
from Utah Pie. But no adverse effect on competing customers was
alleged in this case. Here the question presented to the Court involved
24. See generally Machlup, Characteristics and Types of Price Discrimination, in
BusINEss CONCENTRATION AND PRICE PoICY 397 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research 1955).
For comments on the "kill-the-rival" theory, see id. 423-27. But for critical analysis of this
latter concept, see McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1
J. LAw & EcoN. 137 (1958).
25. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 210-18 (3d ed. 196).
26. See Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for Re-
appraisal, 42 U. WAsH. L REv. 1, 13 (1966).
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the alleged use of price discrimination by Pet, Carnation and Con-
solidated as a device by which the plaintiff Utah Pie was or might be
foreclosed from the Utah frozen-fruit-pie market in such manner as to
violate section 2(a) of the Act.
The issue, then, as the court of appeals saw it, involved deciding
whether the "kill-the-rival" face of price discrimination was either
intended or foreseeable. Was there any evidence that the Utah Pie
Company would be eliminated, or even cowed into following the price
leadership of the national firms that had entered the Salt Lake City
market? If so, was it likely that competition would be lessened in the
market, in the short or long run? Conceptually, the questions could be
considered discretely. If competition was in fact to be considered the
ultimate aim of the Robinson-Patman Act, the court of appeals could
have considered the death or disciplining of the Utah Pie Company
irrelevant to the purposes of the Act if it concluded that the remaining
firms would among themselves provide a competitive market. But even
if the preservation of the Utah Pie Company as an active competitor
was considered the final goal, the court of appeals might well have
found from the robust good health and continued price competition
of that firm that the Act was not violated. The court of appeals in over-
turning the jury verdict and holding for the respondents did not
clearly indicate whether its decision was based on the health of compe-
tition in the market or the health of Utah Pie as a competitor. The
Supreme Court opinion, because of its slight of hand in submerging
the "effect-on-competition" issue, did not answer either question.
The White opinion could slide by the crucial question-whether
competitive effect is irrelevant, since only competitors count, or con-
clusively presumed to follow from the adverse effect of price discrimina-
tion on rivals-only because the majority completely rejects the third
theory of price discrimination: use to promote competition by under-
mining local cartels or monopolies.
This procompetitive use of price discrimination has been widely
recognized in the economic literature, even by strong believers in the
"kill-the-rival" theory. Careful assessment is correspondingly acknowl-
edged to be a prerequisite to a determination whether competition is,
proximately and ultimately, promoted or inhibited by discrimination.
This approach, unlike the Supreme Court opinion in Utah Pie, focuses
on the central purpose of antitrust law, competitive market effect.
Friends as well as foes 6f an anti-price-discrimination law, for example,
have expressed grave doubts about the appropriateness of an automatic
rule regarding sporadic or selective area price discrimination of the
Vol. 77: 70, 1967
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type involved in Utah Pie. Commissioner Elman, for example, has
commented in a recent article:
In a local market dominated by few firms, the entry of a national
seller prepared to lower its price in order to secure a foothold in
a market may be the only cure for a rigid price structure charac-
teristic of oligopoly. Such a national seller may be unwilling to
lower its price in such a local market if it is required to make the
same price reduction in all the markets in which it does business.
Selective price cutting may also be the necessary first step in a
general lowering of prices.... In general, a lack of uniformity
in the prices of a national seller, competing in many geographic
markets, may simply reflect the seller's flexibility in adjusting
price to meet different competitive conditions in different markets.
Insistence on price uniformity in such situations could lead to
high rigid prices and thereby hurt competition seriously.
The Commissioner might have had the facts of the Utah Pie case
before him as he wrote this, as charts 1 through 4 dearly indicate.
Chart 1 shows the oligopolistic nature of the Salt Lake City market
and, in addition, indicates the importance of two large customers-
Safeway Stores and Associated Grocers. The prime factor in Pet's
mushrooming sales in 1959 was its contract for Safeway's private-brand
business. The emergence of Associated Grocers as an even larger ac-
count for Utah Pie in 1960 allowed the latter to increase its sales and
partially recoup the market share lost to Pet in 1959. Notable also
in chart I is the decline in Pet's private-brand sales to Safeway in 1960
and 1961 while Utah Pie's business with Associated Grocers continued
to rise. It is also apparent that except for 1961 Continental was a minor
factor in the market. One conclusion is eminently dear: if any rival
was being killed, it was not Utah Pie.
Charts 2 and 3 compare the lowest prices charged by Pet and Carna-
tion month by month in several Western markets. There was dearly no
consistent pattern; indeed, prices were lower in Utah than in other
areas for either company only in several exceptional months of the 44
months reported. This sort of sporadic, unsystematic hodgepodge of
price differences is precisely what Elman has described as "seller's
flexibility in adjusting price to meet different competitive conditions
in different markets."
Chart 4 depicts the lowest price offers month by month of the three
27. Id.
28. See pp. 72 supra and 80-82 infra. The charts are compiled from data contained in
the Supreme Court and appellate court opinions.
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major competitors in the Salt Lake City market. The downward trend
of prices is apparent. The generally lower prices of the Utah Pie Com-
pany indicate the market conditions faced by its competitors. The
comparison of prices surely does not show Pet or Carnation as price
aggressors, much less potential "rival killers."
A reappraisal of standards for competitive injury is urgently needed,
as Elman argues. "It should be clear," he wrote, "that a simple test of
whether a price reduction results in a diversion of business cannot
suffice for determining injury to competition among sellers."' - The
Federal Trade Commission seems to have begun to move away from
any such per se approach to area price discrimination, according to
Elman.30 Mr. Justice White has apparently stopped this movement in
its tracks.
Commissioner Elman is, however, equally concerned that national
firms selling in multiple markets may use price discrimination as a
"weapon for the destruction of competition."3' The weakness of this
"weapon theory," however, reemphasizes the importance of recogniz-
ing the procompetitive aspects of price discrimination. There just is no
credible theory of predation explaining how price discrimination can
be an effective "weapon"' in killing rivals. Such a theory would expose
how the predator could use price discrimination as a means of impos-
ing higher costs upon his victim than himself. Instead this condemna-
tion of price discrimination relies upon what may be called a "deep-
pocket" mythology. If a deep pocket filled with loot from selling
"goods of the same quality" in another market is to be viewed as pro-
viding funds for waging warfare, why do not gains from unrelated
sales do the job as well? And what about a windfall from a wealthy
relative? Indeed, why is not any departure from dead-level equality of
wealth an equally good weapon with which to kill rivals? Could it not
be argued as plausibly that all price competition should be banned
because substantial equality of financial resources is beyond reach?
Outlawing price discrimination because it might transfer funds to
kill or harass competitors deserves about as much support as outlawing
income itself because it might be spent on burglars' tools. The pro-
competitive aspects of price discrimination, in contrast, are manifest.
But one need not conclude that price discrimination is no more anti-
competitive than other forms of aggressive prices, financed from un-
29. Elman, supra note 26, at 13-14.
So. Id. 14.
31. Id. 8.
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related sources, to deplore the Utah Pie decision. In the first place, the
evidence that respondents Continental and Pet did in fact transfer
funds earned elsewhere to finance price discrimination in the Salt
Lake City market is at best shaky. Pet was sustaining accounting losses
in its frozen-pie operations during the greater part of the period in
question. To suggest, as Mr. Justice White seems to have, that the
greater losses in the Salt Lake City market were in some sense made
possible by smaller losses elsewhere defies logic. Respondent Continen-
tal sold below average total cost, but not below marginal cost. To claim
that an entrepreneur meeting marginal costs and making some contri-
bution toward overhead is not behaving in good businesslike fashion
ignores elementary economics. And if entrepreneurs do in fact set
prices by the sort of opportunity-cost analysis discussed earlier in con-
junction with the "cost justification" defense, the very concept of sales
"below (historical) cost" becomes irrelevant.
In the second place, the task is not completed even if it can be con-
cluded that (1) the respondents in Utah Pie transferred funds to the
Salt Lake City market in some conceptualistic sense, and (2) the anti-
trust law should regard such "loot" earned by a firm bent on expanding
its empire, and with the marketing savvy to do so, as more "dangerous"
than an untainted windfall to an untutored heir. A theory of predatory
pricing, discriminatory or nondiscriminatory, must assume that the
aggressor expects his temporary losses to be overbalanced by higher
prices after his "victim" has been eliminated. This in turn requires the
further assumption that neither the victim nor anyone else will reenter
the market and eliminate the new monopoly when prices are raised.
For this to be true there must be an effective barrier to entry or reentry.
Much has been written-most of it more confusing than clarifying-
about entry barriers arising from the unequal availability of funds to
large and small firms, or from the advantages of internal profits as
contrasted with the financial markets as a source of funds. But the actual
existence of such barriers remains a conundrum. In any event, these
problems were never reached in Utah Pie because the plaintiff-peti-
tioner was prospering.
The Supreme Court ignored these basic issues properly raised by a
charge that price discrimination has or is likely to injure primary-line
competition. In doing so it ignored its role of providing reasoned
decision. The result is not very serious to pie-eaters in Utah. They can
eat cake. But it is indeed serious that the antitrust law has been turned
into a law against price competition. Utah Pie must rank as the most
anticompetitive antitrust decision of the decade. This is no mean
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achievement in view of strong competition from such decisions as
Brown Shoe,32 Von's Groce2ry,33 Clorox 34 and Consolidated Foods.3
The protection of competitors is characteristic of each of these cases.
The decisions there, however, although muddled in their economic
analysis and blind to important consumer-benefitting efficiencies, did
not strike direct blows at competitive pricing. Prior to Utah Pie the
Supreme Court never unequivocally required a restraint of trade.
32. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
33. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
34. FTC v. Procter 9- Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
35. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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